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Abstract
This article unpacks the jurisprudential footprints of international criminal courts
and tribunals in domestic civil litigation in the United States conducted under the
Alien Tort Statute (ats). The ats allows victims of human rights abuses to file tortbased lawsuits for violations of the laws of nations. While diverse, citations to international cases and materials in ats adjudication cluster around three areas: (1) aiding
and abetting as a mode of liability; (2) substantive legal elements of genocide and
crimes against humanity; and (3) the availability of corporate liability. The limited
capacity of international criminal courts and tribunals portends that domestic tort
claims as avenues for redress of systematic human rights abuses will likely grow in
number. The experiences of us courts of general jurisdiction as receivers of international criminal law instruct upon broader patterns of transnational legal migration
and reveal an unanticipated extracurricular legacy of international criminal courts
and tribunals.
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Domestic criminal law informs the register of international criminal law,
whether formally through the development of general principles of law or
informally through experience and analogy. Reciprocally, international criminal law also informs the register of domestic criminal law, whether formally
through incorporation of treaty and custom or, once again, informally through
experience and analogy. Circulation thereby arises within the curricular sphere
of penal responsibility.
Might international criminal law nonetheless, and perhaps unexpectedly,
stray elsewhere in domestic law? When it comes to municipal legal practice,
might international criminal law cast a somewhat longer shadow, travel a bit
farther, or leave a somewhat haler legacy?
This article assesses the jurisprudential impact of international criminal
courts and tribunals on domestic civil litigation in the United States for gross
human rights abuses, specifically in Alien Tort Statute (ats)1 claims brought in
us federal courts. The ats allows victims of human rights abuses to file tortbased lawsuits for violations of the laws of nations (a phrase taken to mean
customary international law).
The analysis begins with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ictr). This article undertakes a search of references to ictr case-law
and materials in ats judgments. It identifies a set of ats judgments containing
such references. Overwhelmingly, these judgments also include references
to the work product of other international criminal courts and tribunals. us
judges who cite to ictr work product to determine the rule of application
in an ats dispute frequently invoke the case-law and materials of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (icty), International
Criminal Court (icc), the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (imt),
the American Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (amt), and the International
Criminal Court (icc). Hence, this article references these cases and
materials as well. The entangled nature of these citations suggests that us
judges perceive international courts and tribunals as constituting some form
of system.
This article therefore interrogates the migration of substantive criminal law
from the public international domain to private municipal tort law. This article
abstains from endorsing or challenging the desirability of tort-based claims or
international criminal tribunals as modalities of post-conflict accountability.
Its goal, rather, is to investigate judicial method and the role of transnational
legal migrations therein.
1 28 u.s.c. § 1350 (2012). The ats is also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act (atca) or Alien
Tort Act (ata).

international criminal law review 16 (2016) 412-447

414

Drumbl

Assuredly, the ats retains key aspects of penal and international law2 in
that the tort claim hinges upon finding a breach of a customary international
criminal norm. What is more: governmental and political entities, notably the
us State Department, may express firm opinions regarding ongoing litigation –
for example, how it interfaces with international comity – and may actively
share that opinion with the deciding judges. On the other hand, ats litigation
departs from international criminal proceedings when it comes to venue (civil
litigation at the national level), remedy (monetary damages), burden of proof
(balance of probabilities), goals (compensation rather than incarceration),
standing (private plaintiffs), actionability (only definable, universal, and obligatory customary international norms are enforceable), and management
(national judges in courts of general jurisdiction).
ats verdicts are infrequently enforced. Victims rarely collect. Individual
defendants often are impecunious or outside the jurisdiction. At times, to be
sure, cases are settled and compensation will pass hands as part of that settlement. That said, ats litigation triggers expressive effects. It ventilates obscured
tragedies and empowers victims who initiate claims. ats litigation also educates the public. The judgment of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Kadić
v. Karadžić, for example, widely disseminated the horrors of Bosnian rape
camps and endemic gender-based violence at a time when the icty was still in
its infancy.3
This article does not deliver quantitative or empirical results beyond the
most rudimentary tabulations. This article simply identifies cases in which us
federal judges adjudicating ats disputes have relied upon ictr cases and ictr
materials, and discusses how and for which purposes these materials – along
with those of other international institutions – have been received. The
research is best described as qualitative. These modest research findings nonetheless evoke a fascinating story of legal transplant, migration, digestion, legacy, and professionalism – on this latter point, the relationship of national
judges with international law.
In light of the sharply limited capacity of international criminal courts
and tribunals, domestic tort claims as avenues for redress of systematic
human rights abuses will likely grow in number. The experiences of us courts

2 See e.g., James G. Stewart, ‘The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes:
Transcending the Alien Tort Statute’, 47 New York University Journal of International Law and
Politics (2014) 121–206, pp. 128–30 (describing international criminal law as the ats’s ‘brotherin-arms’ and noting that the ats and international criminal law ‘overlap substantively’).
3 Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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of general jurisdiction as ‘receivers’ of international criminal law reveal broader
patterns of transnational legal migration and a largely unanticipated legacy of
international criminal courts and tribunals. Distortions may nonetheless arise
when international norms migrate into legal practices at the national level, in
particular, when they do so in cognate legal regimes. These migrations constitute national practices indicative of ‘comparative international law’, namely,
that international legal norms may take shape differently among, and within,
various national jurisdictions. While international criminal lawyers may welcome the broad diffusion of international norms, including extracurricularly
from the criminal to civil context in a rich array of venues, concerns emerge
should the content of the norms fragment and, thereby, weaken international
law’s purported universality. The us experience is thereby instructive in terms
of striking the appropriate relationship between national courts and international law. Should national courts serve as dispassionate law enforcers, as
translators of law, or as engaged law creators? Should international judges be
mindful of the at times unforeseen afterlife of the jurisprudence they create?
Obversely, the us experience also raises questions as to whether the specialised, and at times inconsistent, work-product of the international criminal
courts and tribunals is even suitable for broader dissemination and incorporation at the national level.
Part 1 introduces the ats and its legal elements. ats litigation remains in a
fluid state. Hence, this introduction necessitates a discussion of the jurisdictional and extraterritorial concerns that infuse very recent ats litigation. This
introduction thereby provides a flavour of the kinds of ats claims that may
still be brought. Part 2 sets out the research methods and some preliminary
findings. Part 3 discusses substantive aspects of citation by us judges to ictr
materials. Part 4 places these citations within the broader framework of judicial recourse to icty, icc, imt, and amt materials in the adjudication of ats
disputes. At times, us judges replay amongst themselves debates that roil
international judges and institutions regarding the correct interpretation of a
point of substantive criminal law. Part 5 concludes.
1

The Alien Tort Statute, its Dénouement, and its Resilience

The ats dates from the First Congress (1789). It is a succinct instrument that
reads as follows: ‘The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States’. The ats has limited legislative history. Its brevity nonetheless belies the tremendous jurisprudential complexity it has sired.
international criminal law review 16 (2016) 412-447
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The ats lay largely dormant for two centuries. Beginning in 1980 with the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ judgment in the Filártiga litigation, however,
plaintiffs turned to the ats to pursue redress in us courts for atrocity crimes.4
Plaintiffs did so in a broad variety of factual circumstances, including when
allegations involved abuses committed outside the United States by non-us
nationals against non-us nationals. By definition, plaintiffs pursuing ats
claims will be foreign nationals. In many instances, however, plaintiffs present
some connection to the United States, either because they are physically present in, had moved to, or are non-residents living in the us. These somewhat
more nuanced realities contrast with essentialised depictions of ats claims as
‘foreign-cubed’, rooted in pure universal civil jurisdiction, and utterly dissociated from the United States.
The initiation by plaintiffs, often times with the support of sophisticated
activists, of ats litigation has obliged us courts to determine whether a broad
array of impugned acts actually constitute violations of the laws of nations. In
its 2004 opinion in the Sosa case, the us Supreme Court ruled that, while the
identification of substantive causes of action under the ats should proceed
cautiously, the statutory remedy is not to be limited only to those violations of
the laws of nations acknowledged in 1789.5 Rather, the remedy covers violations extant today that bear comparable universality and specificity to those
that had been recognised in 1789. Courts are to invigilate this process of transhistorical analysis. Actionable contemporary norms must be of sufficiently
definite, obligatory, mutual, and universal character. Although the ‘law of
nations’ is taken by us courts to mean customary international law, the importation of these criteria qualifies general understandings of the elements of customary international law. While customary international law constitutes the
rule of decision to determine a substantive violation of the ats, another debate
has erupted in ats jurisprudence: whether customary international law or
domestic us law ought to serve as the rule of decision in determining the
modes by which an alleged tortfeasor becomes implicated in the tortious conduct. Overall, the tendency appears to be that customary international law
should govern this latter determination as well.
A first generation of ats claims pursued individuals based on their alleged
direct involvement in atrocity crimes. A second wave that began in the 1990’s
4 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving a civil claim by two Paraguayan
citizen parents against a Paraguayan police officer who tortured and killed their son in
Paraguay; the family initiated the claim after both parties had emigrated to the United
States).
5 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 u.s. 692 (2004).
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targeted corporations on theories of aiding and abetting in the commission of
atrocity crimes. This latter wave proved more controversial jurisprudentially
(i.e. regarding modes of liability) as well as politically (i.e. risking a chilling
effect on investment in developing nations, dragging us courts into disputes
that lacked connections with the jurisdiction, and interfering with the conduct
of us foreign relations).
These controversies suffused the Kiobel case, decided in April 2013 on jurisdictional grounds regarding the extraterritorial application of us statutes.
Here, the us Supreme Court sharply curtailed the scope of future ats claims
by requiring proof of a compelling nexus with the United States:
[E]ven where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application. Corporations are often present in
many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate
presence suffices.6
These concerns have animated other recent us Supreme Court cases in divergent
areas of the law, leading to a general reticence to exercise jurisdiction over disputes that lack a compelling nexus with the United States.7 In this sense, us
courts can be seen to respond to the emergent transnationalisation of disputes by
retrenching the salience of geography, nationality, sovereignty, and territoriality.
The facts of Kiobel involved Nigerian citizens, albeit long-time legal residents of the United States on asylum grounds, who pleaded that Dutch, British,
and Nigerian oil exploration and extraction corporations aided and abetted
the Nigerian government in committing systemic human rights violations during the 1990s. All nine judges dismissed the case, holding that the factual context was too remote from the United States to justify allowing the claim to
continue. Chief Justice Roberts – writing for a five justice majority – robustly
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the ats. Justice Kennedy8
6 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
7 See e.g., Morrison v. National Australian Bank, 561 u.s. 247 (2010). Morrison addressed the
extraterritorial application of the us Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Court held that the
Act applied only to transactions involving services listed on domestic stock exchanges and to
domestic transactions in other securities. See also eeoc v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499
u.s. 244, 248 (1991) (construing a statute only to reach conduct within the United States
unless Congress affirmatively declares that the statute applies to conduct abroad).
8 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (‘The opinion for the Court is careful to
leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the
Alien Tort Statute. In my view this is a proper disposition’).
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and Justice Breyer (writing for himself and three others)9 gestured in separate
concurrences towards a slightly more generous approach to jurisdiction.
Justice Alito, in contradistinction, drew a line that was even firmer than that of
Chief Justice Roberts.
Following Kiobel, the Second Circuit in August 2013 restricted the application of the ats in a case involving investment in apartheid-era South Africa.10
The Second Circuit held that Kiobel barred claims against Ford, Daimler, and
ibm (part of the well-known Khulumani litigation). This litigation initially
targeted fifty companies for allegedly aiding and abetting the apartheid
regime. Plaintiffs argued inter alia that ibm and Ford aided the apartheid government and armed forces by providing software and machinery, including
computer systems that categorised the South African population by race.
In April 2014, on remand to the district court, Judge Scheindlin permitted
causes of action to continue against ibm and Ford (companies incorporated in
the United States). In August 2014, however, Judge Scheindlin denied the plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint, thus ending the litigation. She found
that the claims did not sufficiently touch and concern the territory of the
United States.
In October 2014, the Second Circuit nonetheless fashioned a more nuanced
approach in a case (Mastafa v. Chevron and Banque nationale de Paris (bnp))
involving claims arising out of acts of atrocity committed in Iraq during
the Saddam Hussein regime.11 The Mastafa litigation was initiated by Iraqi
women who were victims of torture by agents of the Hussein government or
whose husbands were the victims of such torture. Plaintiffs, some of whom
had become us citizens or permanent residents, claimed that defendant corporations aided and abetted these abuses by paying the Hussein regime kickbacks related to the Oil-for-Food Programme. It was alleged these kick-backs
eventually served to finance acts of torture. In Mastafa, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the alleged human rights abuses and the theory of
aiding and abetting could be cognisably pleaded under the ats. The Second
Circuit also importantly ruled that the relevant conduct sufficiently touched
9

10
11

Ibid., p. 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (‘I would find jurisdiction under this statute where:
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or
(3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American
national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind’).
Balintulo v. Daimler ag, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014).
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and concerned the United States, thus squaring the facts at hand with the
Kiobel test.12 It specified:
Chevron’s oil purchases, financing of oil purchases, and delivery of oil to
another u.s. company, all within the United States; and bnp’s use of
a New York escrow account and New York based ‘financing arrangements’
. . . facilitated that regime’s violations of the law of nations, namely war
crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity.13
In another case decided in 2013, however, the Second Circuit dismissed an ats
claim because all of the conduct set forth in the complaint occurred in
Bangladesh.14 Other Circuit Courts of Appeal have also halted ats litigation
owing to extraterritorial concerns. A panel of three judges on the Ninth Circuit,
for instance, applied Kiobel to dismiss a claim that two us-headquartered corporations were complicit in the 1998 bombing of a Colombian village by members of the Colombian air force.15 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed a claim
against Chiquita, a us corporation, alleging that Chiquita supported Colombian
paramilitary forces responsible for torturing and killing banana-plantation
workers, union members, and social activists.16
That said, in yet another case, the Ninth Circuit permitted plaintiffs to
amend their complaint to meet the Kiobel ‘touch and concern’ standard.17
A District of Columbia district court pursued a similar course of action in a
long-standing dispute regarding injuries allegedly inflicted upon plaintiffs by
12
13

14
15
16

17

Ibid., p. 193.
Ibid., p. 195. Ultimately, however, the Court dismissed the claim on entirely separate
grounds, deeming the allegation that the defendants acted with the purpose or intentionality of facilitating or advancing the commission of the crimes by another to be
implausible.
Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2014).
Mujica v. AirScan, 771 F.3d 580, 596 (9th Cir. 2014).
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l Inc., 760 F. 3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct.
1842 (2015). See also Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 592 (11th Cir. 2015) (defendants’
alleged support of a us-designated terrorist organisation was insufficient to oust the
Kiobel presumption and permit jurisdiction).
Doe v. Nestle, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014) rev’g and vacating 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (c.d. Cal.
2010) [hereinafter Doe (2014)]. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied 788 F.3d 946
(9th Cir. 2015), with a dissent (by Bea J.) that referenced the Rome Statute in support of
the proposition that it requires the heightened standard of purpose when it comes to aiding and abetting liability. A petition for writ of certiorari was filed 18 September 2015, and
cert was denied by the us Supreme Court on 11 January 2016. See infra notes 77–79 and
accompanying text for discussion of the reversed 2010 district court opinion.
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Indonesian soldiers employed by corporate defendants to provide security at a
natural gas facility in Aceh.18 In an exhaustive analysis, this district court
emphasised that the extraterritoriality bar will be displaced when the claims
sufficiently touch and concern the United States because of: (1) substantial and
specific domestic conduct relevant to the ats claims, (2) us citizenship or corporate status of the defendant, and (3) the presence of important us national
interests.19 Applying this test to the facts at hand, the presiding judge ascribed
considerable probative value to the allegations that corporate executives in the
us received briefings on rape, torture, unlawful detention, assault, and killings
committed in Aceh; that decision-making was us-based; that the defendant
was incorporated in the us with a principal place of business in the us; and
that security personnel were committing violations through the use of defendant’s equipment.
The Fourth Circuit in Al-Shimari permitted claims to proceed against us
defense contractor caci for abuse and detention at Abu Ghraib.20 The Fourth
Circuit found that ats claims related to the alleged torture at Abu Ghraib
sufficiently touched and concerned the United States because of the defendant corporation’s us status, the us citizenship of the defendant’s employees,
defendant’s status as a contractor of the us government, the location
where contracts were made, and allegations that the wrongful conduct in
question occurred domestically in the United States (i.e. approving, encouraging, and covering up the alleged torture). In a district court case from the
District of Columbia, moreover, the presumption against extraterritoriality
was rebutted when a foreign defendant bombed a us embassy in Kenya, acts in
furtherance of the terrorist plan took place in the us, and the violence was
intentionally directed against the us government and employees.21 Another
district court case from New Jersey involving terrorism also survived a dismissal challenge, even though the alleged effects of the violations of the law of
nations were entirely felt in Sri Lanka.22 In yet another dispute – the Lively
case – a United States district court in Massachusetts denied a summary
18
19
20
21
22

Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 2015 wl 5042118 (6 July 2015) (d.d.c.).
Ibid., p. *7.
Al Shimari v. caci Premier Tech. Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
Mwani v. bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1 (d.d.c. 2013).
Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2.09-cv-05395, 2010 wl 3429592 (d.n.j. 26 August 2010)
(deeming the following factual allegations to be relevant: the defendant hosted meetings
and fundraisers for a foreign terrorist organisation in the United States, donated money to
a us-based group that was purposefully sent to the terrorist organisation, and created
corporations in the United States to facilitate attracting additional donations).
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judgment motion to dismiss in September 2013.23 This case involves an ats
claim against Scott Lively, a pastor, brought by a Ugandan non-governmental
organisation, Sexual Minorities Uganda, alleging violations of the laws of
nations regarding the infliction of persecution against lgtbi persons in
Uganda. Lively, a us citizen, allegedly fomented and attempted to foment these
persecutory acts. In this case, the district court distinguished the facts from
Kiobel because the defendant was an American citizen residing within his
venue and the alleged tortious acts took place to a substantial degree within the
United States over many years with only ‘infrequent actual visits’ to Uganda.24
What is the bottom line, then, when it comes to the ats and extraterritoriality in the wake of Kiobel? Clearly, the range of claims that can be brought has
narrowed. An ats case cannot proceed if the asserted wrongful conduct has
entirely occurred outside of the United States. A defendant’s us citizenship (or
mere corporate presence), while relevant, is not on its own dispositive to satisfy the requirement that the litigation sufficiently touches and concerns the
United States. As is evident from the case-law, however, it is far too early to
sound the death-knell of ats litigation. Claims will continue, in particular,
where the underlying conduct (including manufacture, financing, managing,
or developing) occurs in the United States, where the conduct was intended to
impact the United States, and where the United States may be harbouring an
alleged wrongdoer.
These questions, while an essential introduction to the subject matter, also
stray from the raison d’être of this article. Many years of ats litigation offer a
fascinating laboratory into the deployment of international criminal judgments and materials in domestic civil litigation for gross human rights abuses.
It is towards this laboratory that this article now turns.
2	International Materials in ats Litigation: Sources and Research
Methods
ictr case-law and materials are understood to mean: (1) judicial decisions of
both the ictr Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber; and (2) the ictr
23

24

Sexual Minorities of Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding sufficient allegations to state a claim under the ats, and
determining that ‘the restrictions established in Kiobel on extraterritorial application of the
ats do not apply. . . where Defendant is a citizen of the United States and where his offensive conduct is alleged to have occurred, in substantial part, within this country’. Ibid., p. 310.
Ibid., p. 321.
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Statute itself. A search of us federal judgments was initiated through the
WestlawNext database platform in the summer of 2013.25 This search generated
an opening sample baseline of federal judgments.26 Judgments decided since
2013 were subsequently integrated into the analysis, albeit on a piecemeal
basis, in an effort to qualitatively assess the case law. A second database search
was undertaken in the summer of 2015 to consolidate the findings.27 The initial
set of federal judgments generated by the search for references to ictr cases
and materials in ats litigation was notable in the sense that, with only one
exception, each of the federal judgments also contained a reference to the
materials of one of the icty or the Nuremberg-era tribunals, often times both,
and also at times to the materials of other international criminal courts or tribunals (icc, for example).
One immediate observation is that ictr case-law and materials appear only
in a modest number of ats cases. A number of caveats, however, pertain to this
observation. Many cases that pop up in a search for ats may only involve incidental reference thereto without necessarily involving litigation thereunder;
others may involve strictly extraterritorial questions, to which the substantive
law of the international tribunals is not germane, or invocation of forum non
conveniens or political question doctrine (same irrelevance).28 Since ats
25
26

27
28

Cody Phillips undertook this search.
A search for ‘ats’ in federal materials yielded 1,247 cases. A search for ‘atca’ yielded 325 cases.
In order to focus the research, Phillips began the analysis with the 75 cases that resulted
from a search for ‘(ats or atca) and ictr’. He then analysed any additional cases identified by
the following searches: ‘(ats or atca) and icty’ (76 total results), ‘(ats or atca) and Nuremberg’
(76 total results), ‘(ats or acta) and Rwanda’ (62 total results), and ‘(ats or atca) and Yugoslavia’
(65 total results). He also conducted searches individually combining ‘ats’ or ‘atca’ with the
‘ictr’, ‘icty’, ‘Rwanda’, ‘Yugoslavia’, and ‘Nuremberg’ without discovering any unanalysed
results. This sample had 98 cases. Within each of the 98 cases in the sample, Phillips used
the internal search function to identify any references to ‘ictr’, ‘icty’, ‘Rwanda’, ‘Yugoslavia’, or
‘Nuremberg’. He did not record citations to other federal cases where the search terms were
located in explanatory parentheticals. Of the 98 cases in the sample, 31 contained at least
one reference to one, some, or all of the ictr, icty, or Nuremberg Statutes or case-law.
A total of 25 referenced the ictr, 25 referenced the icty, and 21 referenced Nuremberg.
Annie Cox undertook this search.
Conversely, some ictr citations in ats cases do not relate to substantive points of customary international law. These, however, are rare. See e.g., Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d
1057, 1106 n.50 (c.d. Cal. 2010), rev’d and vacated, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing the
ictr’s 2003 Semanza trial chamber judgment in support of the appropriateness of citing
Black’s Law Dictionary when interpreting the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals; in
Semanza, the Trial Chamber had cited to Black’s inter alia for definitions of ‘plan’ and ‘aid
and abet’).
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claims began in earnest in the early 1980’s, over a decade of ats litigation preceded the creation of the ictr and nearly two decades of this litigation took
place prior to consistently produced ictr case-law. Finally, it is plausible that
a percentage of results yielded by the acronym ats (or atca) involve totally
unrelated subject-matter.
Citations to the case-law and materials of international criminal courts and
tribunals in ats litigation may be modest in number but they are neither sporadic nor intermittent. Nor are they thoughtless. International case-law and
materials are deliberately invoked when it comes to determining the content
of the law of nations. A district court in the District of Columbia, for example,
described the ictr and icty as ‘authoritative’ on the subject of interpreting
customary international law.29 A decade earlier, another district court judge
had held:
United States courts that have been required to describe elements of the
‘law of nations’ or other international law concepts have frequently
turned to the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and have, with apparently only one
exception, approved of such decisions.30
us federal courts appear to consider the case-law and materials of international criminal courts and tribunals alternately as sources of international
law31 or as evidence of customary international law.32 Although these materials
29

30

31

32

Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 2015 wl 5042118, p. *7 (6 July 2015) (d.d.c.) (noting also that ‘[t]he
decisions of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the other post-World
War ii Nuremberg tribunals also provide authoritative guidance about the content of customary international law’).
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 226 f.r.d. 456, 478 n.21 (s.d.n.y.
2005) (citation omitted). Cf. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344 (n.d. Ga. 2002)
(noting that the statutes and opinions of the ad hoc tribunals are ‘particularly relevant’).
See e.g., Doe viii v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 30 (d.c. Cir. 2011), vacated in part, 527
Fed. Appx. 7 (2013) (mem), remanded to 69 F.Supp.3d 75 (d.d.c. 2013) [hereinafter Doe viii
(2011)] (citing Article 6 of the ictr Statute among other international sources) (‘Decisions
of the courts established by the u.n. Security Council, the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg established in the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis … and the several Nuremberg tribunals are
recognised as an authoritative source of customary international law’); Doe (2014), p. 1020
(describing ictr and icty decisions as ‘authoritative sources of customary international
law’ and the scsl Taylor decision as ‘a proper source of international law for ats claims’).
See Presbyterian Church v. Talisman, 374 F. Supp.2d 331, 338 (s.d.n.y. 2005) (Judge Cote
holding that: ‘Although the Tribunals do not create new rules of customary international
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help identify and legitimate a rule of decision, this vacillation among us judges
generates some doctrinal confusion. Furthermore, those courts that view these
materials as sources hedge as to whether these are primary or subsidiary
sources pursuant to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. The most representative way to typologise the approach of us federal
judges, however, is that they turn to international case-law and materials
(notably ictr, icty, Nuremberg-era tribunals, and the icc) as authoritative
evidence of the existence and content of a customary rule (in other words, of
the state of customary international law). To be sure, this approach is not without exception. For example, one Circuit Court of Appeals judge in 2007 chastised reliance on the ‘unorthodox practices of the icty and ictr’, reasoning
that judgments of the ad hoc tribunals were ‘useless precedent on the issue of
liability of private parties for violations of customary international law’.33
Instead, this judge ruled that the Rome Statute (at the time signed by 139 countries and ratified by 105) and amt cases were appropriate authorities to demonstrate the content of customary international law, in this particular case
regarding elements of aiding and abetting liability. The fact that the judge in
question devoted many pages of detailed text justifying his position indicates
the level of seriousness with which the intersection of the work product of
international criminal law institutions and national private law frameworks is
taken in the context of ats litigation.

33

law, they occupy a special role in enunciating the current content of customary international law norms. icty and ictr opinions typically engage in nuanced and exhaustive
surveys of international legal sources, and as such, they are exceedingly useful as persuasive evidence of the content of customary international law norms’); see also Almog v.
Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 287 (e.d.n.y. 2007). In her 2005 opinion on the motion for
judgment on the pleadings in Presbyterian Church, Judge Cote also emphasised the following indicia of the jurisprudential value of the icty and ictr Statutes: (1) their creation by Security Council resolution, which are binding upon all member states; (2) the
imperative nature of their prosecutorial mandates; and (3) their purpose to ‘adjudicate
violations of customary international law’. Presbyterian Church, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
Judge Cote also viewed decisions of the Nuremberg tribunals in this fashion. Ibid., p. 336
n.10–11. Quaere whether it is appropriate for her to do so in light of the fact that these tribunals were established in very different fashion than the icty or ictr. Judge Cote felt
similarly about the icc. Ibid., p. 339. As regards the icc, she noted: ‘The objections raised
by the United States [to the Rome Statute] centered on the procedures contained in the
final draft … not the substance of the international legal rules contained therein’. Ibid.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 331, 335 (2nd Cir. 2007) (holding additionally that the icty and ictr Statues are ‘custom-made’ and that they ‘address particular international crises’ in ways that ‘are sometimes contrary to evolving norms of
customary international law’).
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For the most part, references to ictr materials in domestic ats litigation
primarily reinforce or confirm the existence of certain substantive rules of customary international law. At times, however, these references are jurisgenerative in that they establish new law, applicable directly at the national level,
which may in fact be more progressive than the extant rules as generally
understood. For example, Lively references ictr judgments (and other international sources) to support the proposition that an orchestrated campaign of
intimidation of lgbti persons constitutes persecution as a crime against
humanity.34 A review of ats jurisprudence reveals the tendency of certain us
judges to tread cautiously with regard to the content of customary international law while other judges proceed quite audaciously. This observation gestures toward the attitudinal diversity among us federal judges.
In a number of instances, inconsistent treatment of the same putative
rule arises among the differing judicial Circuits. This fragmentation may
vex outside readers, but it actually is somewhat uneventful within the us federal system insofar as the different Circuits can proceed in their own directions. In situations of serious Circuit splits, however, the us Supreme Court
steps in to resolve such différends. That said, this variability among judges and
Circuits with regard to content and meaning might pose a sui generis set of
challenges when it comes to international law as a rule of decision in light of
international law’s universalising aspirations as well as the ongoing relevance
of positivistic notions of state consent. This variability may be problematic
when it occurs within a national jurisdiction; as it may be problematic when it
occurs as among different national jurisdictions. In both instances, courts,
either within or among national systems, may seek to create international law
rather than simply apply international law. Such juridical tendencies earned
the scorn of Lord Hoffman in the Jones v. Saudi Arabia case, which involved a
claim of torture brought in the United Kingdom and the applicability inter alia
of immunities to international crimes. In discussing jurisprudence from Italy
that dismissed immunities as a lower-order value, Lord Hoffman warned:
It is not for a national court to ‘develop’ international law by unilaterally
adopting a version of that law which, however desirable, forward-looking
and reflective of values it may be, is simply not accepted by other states.35
34

35

Sexual Minorities of Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 304, 310 (D. Mass. 2013) (‘[M]any authorities implicitly support the principle that widespread, systematic persecution of individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity constitutes a crime against
humanity that violates international norms’).
Jones v. Saudi Arabia, 14 June 2006, House of Lords, [2006] ukhl 26, [63] (appeal taken
from [2004] ewca Civ 1394). Sovereign immunity questions continue to be adjudicated in
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The fact that many ats cases are initially adjudicated on motions to dismiss or
summary judgment motions – in which the facts are taken in the most favourable fashion for the plaintiffs and the legal standard of pleading is one of plausibility36 – may encourage a slightly more purposive or elastic view of the
content of customary international law. Many ats judgments also arise on
motions for leave to amend existing complaints. If and when matters go to
trial, it is readily foreseeable that more restrictive interpretations would
emerge.
A number of ats cases involve the same disputes that sinuously wind their
way up the judicial system, then are remanded back pursuant to interlocutory
motions, only to wend their way up again. Litigation rotates around some epic
claims: for example, Khulumani (South Africa), Mujica (Colombia), Doe v.
Exxon (Indonesia), Doe v. Nestle (Côte d’Ivoire), Presbyterian Church (Sudan),
and Kiobel (Nigeria). These disputes last for many years. The findings presented
in this article include references to international materials in the same dispute
as it works its way up and down varying trial and appellate levels of the federal
judicial system, and then following appeal once again to remand at the trial
level. In these situations, each individual court’s discussion is included separately. This article discusses judgments even if subsequently overturned on
points of law by an appellate circuit court. What is more, en banc appellate
decisions may overturn (and vacate) decisions previously rendered by threemember appellate panels: in these instances, which may occur in ideologically
fraught Circuits, this article includes both the initial appellate decision and the
en banc decision. This article also discusses citations in dissenting opinions.
The bottom line is to offer a qualitative snapshot of the various ways us judges
rely on ictr materials specifically and international materials generally.
Another complicating issue arises when international materials inform
an initial determination of a substantive rule of customary international law,
but then the us court opinion that effected the initial international citation
itself becomes the ongoing point of reference to justify the existence of the
substantive rule. In other words, court X comes to conclusion Y based on international materials. Then court A cites to conclusion Y, justifying the decision

36

the Italian courts. See e.g., Simoncioni v. Germany, 22 October 2014, Constitutional Court,
Judgment No. 238/2014, Gazzeta Ufficiale (spec. ser.), No. 45, 29 October 2014.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 u.s. 662, 678 (2009) (‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face”’). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favour of the
party that resists the motion.
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based only on the precedent of court X instead of the international materials.
Here, international law enters the domestic legal lexicon, but then sheds its
international provenance. In a telling trend, several of the more recent ats
appellate opinions cite less frequently to international materials than had
been the case in earlier opinions. In us courts, apparently, the legitimacy of a
Circuit Court of Appeals citation (or even that of a district court) on a point of
law tends to exceed what may be seen as the more risqué reliance on international sources, although international sources may have generated the initial
substantive rule. In other national jurisdictions, a contrario, citation to an
international source may be seen as conferring greater legitimacy or credibility
to the assertion of the existence or content of a specific substantive rule of
customary international law.
Which ictr materials receive the most attention? The ictr Statute is frequently cited. Citations also are made to a number of cases. When it comes to
case citation, a fairly scattershot approach is taken. Citations are broadly dispersed and not clustered into one or two cases alone. On the other hand, some
advantage emerges in terms of subsequent citation frequency for early adjudication in ictr history. This, however, is likely nothing more than the simple
gift of temporality. Another factor that would likely bear upon the frequency of
citation – but that this research does not explore – is language, notably,
whether specific judgments and materials are available in English.37 Ostensibly,
this variable would affect the accessibility of all international materials in us
courts. I do not see this variable, however, as relevant in the case of the ictr
(or icty or icc). The ictr’s official languages were English and French.
Overwhelmingly, judgments have been rendered in or translated into English;
all statutory and regulatory materials are available in English.
3

ictr Citations and ats Litigation: Substantive Aspects

Which of the ictr’s work has had the greatest impact in us courts, and in
which areas of customary international law?
Citations to ictr materials are diverse but cluster around three substantive
areas: (1) aiding and abetting as a mode of liability; (2) the definition and legal
elements of genocide and crimes against humanity; and (3) corporate liability.
This Part considers each of these three areas in greater depth. In addition, stray
references in ats litigation to ictr materials touch upon some residual issues,
such as exhaustion of local remedies and conspiracy as applicable only to
37

Thanks to Kai Ambos for this point.
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genocide or aggressive war.38 Other occasional ictr citations appear on the
issue of command responsibility, for example as a liability theory in cases of
failure to prevent the commission of crimes or to punish subordinates following the commission of crimes,39 or, in addition, when contemplating the extension of command responsibility into the context of private companies.40
3.1
Aiding and Abetting
Establishing the availability and parameters of aiding and abetting liability
under customary international law became particularly salient to ats litigation
once plaintiffs targeted corporations as defendants insofar as corporations
could only be accessorily linked to the wrongdoing. ictr materials inform judicial conversations about the existence of aiding and abetting liability under customary international law41 and, secondly, help delineate the required elements
of such liability (i.e. addressing whether a defendant need act only with knowledge of the criminal goals or must purposefully intend to facilitate those goals).
38

39
40

41

Presbyterian Church v. Talisman, 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 663–64 (s.d.n.y. 2006) (limiting conspiracy only to conspiracies to commit genocide and to wage aggressive war, and citing
the Nahimana decision (and ictr Statute) to emphasise the recognition of conspiracy
only in the context of genocide). Relatedly, this judgment also contrasted the doctrine of
conspiracy in the ictr with us law’s Pinkerton principle, under which a defendant ‘could
not be held liable under the ats for the conduct of a co-conspirator merely because that
conduct was foreseeable’. Ibid., p. 665.
Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1330–33 (n.d. Cal. 2004) (relying on ictr case-law to extend
command responsibility beyond the context of military superiors alone).
Giraldo v. Drummond Company, 2013 wl 3873978 (n.d. Ala. 2013), aff’d 782 F. 3d 576 (11th
Cir. 2015) (noting that, in the 2000 Musema Trial Judgment, command responsibility was
used in the case of a director of a public factory and, hence, was not a basis to warrant
doctrinal extension into the context of private companies).
See e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(relying on different bases for aiding and abetting as theory of liability under the ats). In
his concurring opinion, Judge Katzmann relied heavily on international law as the appropriate rule of application. Ibid. at pp. 264–84. Judge Hall instead relied on federal common law. Ibid., pp. 284–92. See also Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp.2d 1057, 1079 (c.d. Cal. 2010)
(‘Aiding and abetting liability is prominent in the Nuremberg Tribunals, the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the Statute of the
International Criminal Court’), rev’d and vacated, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014); see also
ibid., p. 1079 n.25 (citing to Article 6 of the ictr Statute); Doe viii (2011), p. 31(citing Article
6 of the ictr Statute among other international sources); Presbyterian Church v. Talisman,
453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 666 (s.d.n.y. 2006); In re ‘Agent Orange’ Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F.Supp.
2d 7, 54 (e.d.n.y. 2005); Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (e.d.n.y. 2007); Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., 2007 wl 2349343 (n.d. Cal. 14 August 2007); Sexual Minorities of Uganda
v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013).
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The existence of aiding and abetting liability is settled in ats jurisprudence.
Considerable fractiousness, however, emerges regarding the elements that a
plaintiff must establish both in pleading and subsequently at trial. This fractiousness matches the reality that these questions are far from resolved in and
among the practices of the various international criminal courts and tribunals.
The actus reus of aiding and abetting requires proof of providing assistance
or other forms of support to the commission of a crime. This assistance must
be substantial. Controversy arises, however, over whether international law
imposes the additional requirement that assistance must be specifically
directed towards the commission of the crime. In 2014, the icty resolved quarrels regarding proof of specific direction in Šainović when, overturning its own
antecedent case-law, the icty Appeals Chamber ruled in favour of rejecting the
specific direction requirement as part of the actus reus in contexts where the
defendant is remote from the crimes.42 In December 2015, the Šainović
approach was affirmed by the icty Appeals Chamber in its judgment in Stanisić
& Simatović. The icty’s retreat from the specific direction requirement has
42

Prosecutor v. Šainović, 23 January 2014, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Case No. it-05-87-a, Judgment, paras. 1617–25. In this case, the icty Appeals
Chamber explicitly rejected the position on specific direction in the actus reus that had
been adopted in the earlier and controversial Perišić case, Prosecutor v. Perišić, 28 February
2013, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. it-04-81-a,
Judgment. In Perišić, it had been held that ‘where the accused neither is a part of an
organisation whose exclusive purpose is to commit crimes nor endorses a policy pertaining to their commission, individual criminal responsibility will not accrue except when
the relevant assistance was specifically directed toward the commission of the criminal
activities’. Charles Chernor Jalloh, ‘International Decisions, Prosecutor v. Taylor’, 108(1)
American Journal of International Law (2014) 56–66, pp. 61, 66 n. 21 (noting also that the
icty turned its attention to the issue owing to the ‘need for legal certainty and predictability of the criminal law’). Jalloh observes that in Šainović the icty Appeals Chamber
engaged in a ‘careful subsequent review of national and international authorities’, which
‘amply showed that specific direction was never a legal ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting’. Ibid. Hence, aiding and abetting liability requires only the provision of
‘practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on
the perpetration of the crime’, this being a standard that, according to the icty Appeals
Chamber, reflects customary international law. Šainović, paras. 1626, 1649. Relatedly, the
Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone also decided not to pursue the
specific direction requirement in the Taylor case. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, 26 September
2013, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. scsl-03-01-a, Appeals Judgment, para. 486.
Because of the framing of the appeal by the defence, however, much of the discussion of
specific direction in the Taylor appeals judgment took place within the elements of the
mens rea. Ibid., paras. 471–81.
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nonetheless not defused this controversy within ats adjudication. While noting the rejection of the specific direction test by the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (scsl) and some icty judgments (though not the repudiation of the test
in Šainović), the Ninth Circuit nonetheless refused to formally relax the specific direction requirement for domestic purposes.43 The District of Columbia
Circuit, on the other hand, remains unflagging in its view that specific direction is not an element of aiding and abetting liability under customary international law.44
In addition, us courts have turned to ictr authority to determine whether
the actus reus of aiding and abetting requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of
the crime.45 In 2015, citing the ictr appeals judgments in Ndahimana and
Nzahonimana, a district court judge ruled that while a link or connection must
be established between the aider and abettor’s actions and the underlying
crime, a ‘cause-effect relationship’ between the two is not required.46
The standard for mens rea in aiding and abetting triggers additional debate,
notably, whether knowledge alone, given proof of the substantial effect of the
defendant’s acts upon the commission of the crime, suffices or whether purpose must be shown. us judges split when it comes to the knowledge or purpose element. Some rely on knowledge alone.47 These judges, for example on
the District of Columbia Circuit, have invoked ictr materials.48 The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is generally taken to affirm a knowledge standard.
Other us judges, however, require the higher bar of intentionality. On this
43
44

45
46
47
48

See Doe (2014).
Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 2015 wl 5042118, p. *10 (6 July 2015) (d.d.c.). This judgment reviewed
a series of ictr cases (Ndahimana, Ntawukulilyayo, Kalimanzira) which it interpreted as
invoking the specific direction requirement, but then discounted their interpretive value
on a variety of grounds including lack of clarity and reliance on other international precedent that had since been superseded.
Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 286 (edny 2007).
Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 2015 wl 5042118, p. *8 (6 July 2015) (d.d.c.).
See e.g., Romero v. Drummond, 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.,
578 F. 3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).
Doe viii (2011); Doe (2014), p. 1023 (citing to icty cases, the ictr’s Kayishema Judgment
from 1999, and also the scsl’s Appeals Judgment in Taylor). Assessing the us case-law,
Manuel Ventura argues that purpose does not reflect customary international law. Manuel
J. Ventura, ‘Farewell “Specific Direction”: Aiding and Abetting War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity in Perišić, Taylor, Šainović et al., and us Alien Tort Statute Jurisprudence’,
in: Stuart Casey-Maslen (ed.), The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2013 (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2014), pp. 511–553, p. 513.
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note, in the Second Circuit the appropriate test is whether the defendants
acted with the purpose to aid and abet the violations of customary international law committed by someone else.49 The Fourth Circuit approaches the
question similarly. As discussed in detail infra, judges who prefer this option
look beyond the ad hoc tribunals for support, and incline toward the Rome
Statute as an authoritative source. The Ninth Circuit for its part has declined to
formally establish whether a purpose or knowledge standard applies to aiding
and abetting ats claims.50
In addition, considerable confusion persists within ats jurisprudence
whether specific direction and purpose are mens rea or actus reus requirements.51 At times, specific direction may be deployed as a proxy for purpose;
49

50

51

In the Second Circuit, as clearly announced in the 2009 Presbyterian Church case and
echoed in the 2014 Mastafa case, the ‘mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in
ats actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone’. Mastafa, 770 F.3d 170, 191–92 (2d Cir.
2014) (noting also ‘the lack of a sufficient international consensus’ for imposing individual liability for persons ‘who knowingly (but not purposefully) aid and abet a violation of
international law’). See also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244,
260 (2d Cir. 2009). The judgment in Presbyterian Church relied expressly on Judge
Katzmann’s earlier concurrence in the 2007 Khulumani litigation, which abundantly references international materials. The 2014 Mastafa opinion picked up this thread, noting:
‘Judge Katzmann conducted a lengthy analysis of relevant sources of international law
and concluded that “a defendant may be held liable under international law for aiding
and abetting the violation of that law by another when the defendant (1) provides practical assistance to the principal which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime, and (2) does so with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime”’.
Mastafa, 770 F.3d at p. 192.
Doe (2014), pp. 1023–24. The Ninth Circuit found sufficiently plausible evidence to satisfy
the more ‘stringent’ purpose standard in this case and hence allowed the proceedings to
continue without needing to resolve the legal question. However, Judge Rawlinson in dissent would adopt the approaches of the Second and Fourth Circuits and would ‘definitely
and unequivocally decide that the purpose standard applies to the pleading of aiding and
abetting liability under the ats’. Ibid., p. 1029 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
See Ventura, supra note 48, p. 521. Uncertainty regarding categorisation of the specific
direction requirement also arises within the international criminal tribunals. Ventura discusses at length the separate opinions of Judges Meron and Agius in Perišić, who proposed that specific direction could form part of the mens rea or the actus reus and, in fact,
that it might be best to include it in the mens rea but that it was appropriate to follow the
prior jurisprudence; Judge Ramaroson’s separate opinion also felt that specific direction
was implicit in the mens rea. The defence in the Charles Taylor case raised specific direction in its appeal but ‘chose to concentrate on it more in the mens rea context … arguing
that knowledge of crimes should not be enough, but instead “purpose” was required, and
that “purpose” and “specific direction” were analogous’. Ibid., p. 530 n.90.
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ipso facto, then, a retreat from specific direction could be seen as a move
towards knowledge. This malleability is unsurprising in light of just how complex the determination of these modes of liability has become under international law.
In sum, when it comes to aiding abetting liability, fragmentation at the
international level appears to replicates itself nationally.
3.2	Existence of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity under
Customary International Law and Identification of Elements Thereof
us judges consult ictr materials in support of the prohibition of genocide and
crimes against humanity as customary international law and, as a secondary
matter, to clarify key elements thereof.52 The majority of these citations cluster
in determining crimes against humanity to be proscribed by customary international law.53 An impulse may arise to cite to the ictr (and the icty and
Rome Statute) because of the absence of a comprehensive treaty prohibiting
crimes against humanity, unlike the case with genocide. These judicial references intimate that the work of international criminal courts and tribunals can
fill gaps when treaty law is unavailable to constitute first-best evidence of a
rule of customary international law.
ictr sources also help elucidate the elements of these crimes. ictr materials have clarified the definition of genocide, of an enumerated group, and of
the requisite level of intent;54 and have legitimised the inference of genocidal
intent from facts and circumstances.55 ictr materials have been invoked
to assess the meaning of ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ attack for the purposes
of the chapeau requirements of crimes against humanity,56 along with the
52

53
54

55
56

See e.g., Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2.09-cv-05395, 2010 wl 3429592, p. *8 (d.n.j. 26
August 2010) (turning to the ictr Statute as proof of the list of specific crimes that can
constitute crimes against humanity and noting the expansion of this list since Nuremberg).
See e.g., Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115 (e.d. Cal. 2004).
Abagninin v. amvac Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 739 (9th Cir. 2008) (‘Decisions from international tribunals also reflect the specific intent requirement for genocide. The [ictr’s]
definition of genocide was taken verbatim from the Genocide Convention’). Citing the
ictr’s Trial Judgment in Akayesu, the Ninth Circuit held in this case that ‘the ictr defined
genocide as a crime of specific intent’. Ibid.
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 226 f.r.d. 456, 479 (s.d.n.y. 2005).
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 2007 wl 2349343, p. *3 (n.d. Cal. 14 August 2007) (citing to the
ictr Statute for the substance of the chapeau requirements of crimes against humanity
and that there must be a nexus between the acts of the defendant and these requirements). This opinion turned to the Akayesu judgment to define widespread as ‘massive,
frequent, large-scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and
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meaning of ‘attack’ generally57 and the level of knowledge of an accused
to establish liability.58 ictr materials are also cited to define elements of
persecution as a crime against humanity, including the purposive finding
of protected groups in the Lively trial judgment.59 The Lively court held that
‘[t]o properly plead persecution as a crime against humanity, Plaintiff must
allege both the proper actus reus — denial of fundamental rights — and
mens rea — the intentional targeting of an identifiable group’.60 While recognising that ‘many of the international treaties and instruments that provide
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity list particular protected groups
without specifying lgbti people’, the district court also noted that ‘international courts have interpreted the identity of the group requirement broadly to
encompass persecution of a discrete identity’.61 This is strikingly purposive use
of ictr case-law as authority for the existence of a substantive rule that
exceeds what is commonly accepted as the content of customary international law. us judges adjudicating ats claims also have faced the challenge of
identifying whether a food or medical blockade constitutes a crime against
humanity.62

57

58
59
60
61
62

directed against a multiplicity of victims’ but, interestingly, also observed in a footnote
that ‘case law from the ictr provides little guidance for the application of the chapeau
elements, apparently because there was little dispute that the mass slaughter of Tutsis
and their sympathizers constituted a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population’. Ibid., p. *3 n.2. The district court did not similarly qualify the relevance of icty
jurisprudence. Ibid. See also generally Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1308 (n.d. Cal. 2004).
Sexual Minorities of Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 319 (D. Mass. 2013). This opinion
invoked Akayesu to hold that an attack, for the purpose of a crime against humanity, may
be non-violent in nature. The Court quoted extensively from Akayesu, and noted that
‘imposing a system of apartheid … or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular manner, may come under the purview of attack, if orchestrated on a massive scale
or in a systematic manner’. Ibid.
Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1354 n.50 (n.d. Ga. 2002).
Sexual Minorities of Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 304, 318 (D. Mass. 2013) (citing to
Nahimana).
Ibid., p. 317.
Ibid., pp. 317–18.
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736, 767–68 (9th Cir. 2011) (determining that deprivation of food
or medicine owing to a blockade does not constitute actionable extermination or ‘another
inhumane act’ under the Sosa test), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) to follow Kiobel,
remanded to 722 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). On remand, the initial district court opinion
to dismiss with prejudice was affirmed. A vacated opinion should have no precedential
effect but Doe (2014) explicitly re-affirmed the analysis of the vacated 2011 Sarei opinion
on the topic of corporate liability. The Sarei litigation involved a claim brought by
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us courts have also turned to ictr materials where a non-state actor is
alleged to commit crimes against humanity, in particular, regarding the question whether the non-state actor must exercise a level of de facto control over
territory in order to be held responsible.63 In Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, a district court found that the ltte met this burden for the purposes of plausibility
pleading. Whether the de facto control requirement firmly exists as an element
of the plan or policy aspect of crimes against humanity under customary international law remains unclear.
3.3
Corporate Liability
ictr materials have been interpreted as germane to the question whether corporations can be found criminally liable under international criminal law and,
hence, by analogy to the question whether they may incur civil liability for
violations of the laws of nations. us courts have failed to achieve consensus on
these questions. Considerable fragmentation and vivid contestation persist.

63

residents of Papua New Guinea against an international mining company. The Ninth
Circuit Court relied inter alia on the ictr’s 2006 Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment for the
position that the plaintiff is required to show proof ‘that the accused participated in a
widespread or systematic killing or in subjecting a widespread number of people or systematically subjecting a widespread number of people to conditions of living that would
inevitably lead to death’. Sarei, 671 F.3d at p. 768. Dissenting in part, Judge Pregerson held
that the food and medical blockade constituted murder and torture by denying essential
goods and services to thousands of people (thereby constituting a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population), with both murder and torture being listed as
specific crimes against humanity in the relevant instruments, including the Statute of the
ictr, articles 3(a) and (f). Ibid., pp. 775–76.
See Abagninin v. amvac Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasising a state
actor requirement for crimes against humanity, but also recognising that crimes against
humanity can flow from the actions of a non-state actor when this actor has de facto control over territory similar to that of a state or government); Krishanti, 2010 wl 3429592,
p. *10 (‘Decisions from the [ictr] require that actions by a non-State organization be
“instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization of group”, as a way to
exclude “the situation in which an individual commits an inhumane act . . . in the absence
of any encouragement or direction from either a Government or a group or an organization”’ (citing to the ictr’s Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgments, and also the Ninth
Circuit in Abagninin, which contains the exact same passage in support of a requirement
that, for aiding and abetting a crime against humanity when committed by a non-state
actor, that non-state actor must exert de facto control, that is, ‘control similar to that of a
State or government such as erecting checkpoints on main roads, increasing examples
of command and control, developing civilian structures, and holding a substantial percentage of territory’)).
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While ictr materials are seen as helpful to these debates, judges have drawn
strikingly different inferences from them.
The District of Columbia Circuit in Doe viii v. Exxon (2011),64 and the
Seventh Circuit in Flomo (2011),65 each has held that corporations can be sued
under the ats. The Doe viii litigation – staccato in nature because of appeals,
reversals, vacaturs, and remands – continues: in July 2015, the district court
allowed some of the ats claims to continue because they displaced the presumption against extraterritoriality and because the law in the d.c. Circuit is
clear that corporations can be sued under the ats.66 In Doe viii, Judge
Kavanaugh dissented in the Circuit Court of Appeals. He opined that the ats
did not reach corporate actors.67 To buttress his conclusion, he referenced the
ictr as only having jurisdiction over natural persons. In this regard, the establishment of international tribunals to punish individuals may paradoxically
crimp the ability of the law to reach entities or collectivities. The expansion of
a system of international law that individualises guilt may narrow the range of
appropriate defendants.
On the other hand, other judges have turned to the same set of ictr materials and reached an opposite conclusion. For example, Judge Cote, in dismissing
the motion for judgment on the pleadings in Presbyterian Church, held:
[That] the icty and ictr Statutes do not provide for corporate criminal
liability for genocide and other atrocities carries very little weight as
those Statutes were devised in the context of ethnic and tribal warfare
where atrocities committed by private individuals, not corporations,
loomed large. Such an argument is akin to claiming that a rule governing
64

65
66

67

Doe viii (2011), p. 57 (‘Given that the law of every jurisdiction in the United States and of
every civilized nation, and the law of numerous international treaties, provide that corporations are responsible for their torts, it would create a bizarre anomaly to immunize corporations from liability for the conduct of their agents’).
Flomo v. Firestone National Rubber Company, 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011).
Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 2015 wl 5042118 (6 July 2015) (d.d.c.). Although the 2011 Circuit Court
of Appeals opinion in Doe viii frequently referenced in this Article has been vacated, the
reasons for vacatur and the course of subsequent proceedings in the litigation reaffirm
the legal analysis of the Court of Appeals on the critical points of jurisdiction, corporations as defendants, methodological recourse to international materials, and aiding and
abetting liability.
Doe viii (2011), pp. 83–84 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l
Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 321–26 (2d Cir., 2007) (opinion of Judge Korman relying on several
international sources, including the ictr Statute, to express considerable skepticism
regarding the existence of corporate liability under customary international law).
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the law of the sea has not reached the status of customary international
law because a number of landlocked States have not accepted it.68
That said, and to be very clear, Judge Cote’s view is no longer good law in her
own jurisdiction, the Second Circuit. In 2010, the Second Circuit ruled that corporations may not be held liable for violations of international law under the
ats.69 This 2010 ruling arose in the Kiobel litigation that eventually went to the
Supreme Court. While it was widely anticipated at the time that the Supreme
Court would decide Kiobel on the question whether corporations can be sued
under the ats, in part because of splits among lower courts, the Supreme
Court subsequently ordered the case to be newly briefed and approached it
from the unanticipated perspective of extraterritoriality and jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court’s opinion in Kiobel did not address corporate liability.
Interestingly, in the 2014 Mastafa case, the Second Circuit did not seize the
opportunity to dismiss the complaint because of the corporate nature of the
two defendants. One judge (Judge Scheindlin in the South African litigation)
has interpreted the us Supreme Court’s mention in Kiobel that ‘mere corporate
presence’ cannot overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality as
implying the existence of corporate liability.
In September 2014, in Doe v. Nestle, the Ninth Circuit ruled that there is no
categorical rule of corporate immunity or liability under the ats. In this regard,
the Ninth Circuit explicitly reaffirmed the corporate liability analysis it had
previously reached pre-Kiobel in Sarei v. Rio Tinto.70 This analysis requires that
a court look, in each claim, to international law and determine whether corporations are subject to the norms underlying that specific claim.71 Claims in the
68

69

70

71

Presbyterian Church v. Talisman, 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 336 (s.d.n.y. 2005) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); see also ibid., p. 336 n.10 (‘Indeed, for the purposes of this case, the
value of the icty and ictr Statutes, as well as the decisions of their Tribunals and ats
cases addressing similar subject matter … is that they confirm that customary international law prohibiting violations of jus cogens norms such as genocide applies to private
actors in addition to state actors’).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (relying on the lack of
corporate liability in international tribunals as evidence of customary international law
disfavoring corporate liability).
Doe (2014), pp. 1021–22 (affirming the three principles about corporate liability: no categorical immunity, liability under the ats is independent of international norms of
enforcement, and universal norms can provide the basis for an ats claim against a corporation) (citing to Sarei v. Rio Tinto, plc, 671 F.3d 736, 747–65 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S.
Ct. 1995 (2013), remanded to 722 F.3d 1109 (2013), see supra note 62).
Doe (2014), p. 1022 (‘First, the analysis proceeds norm-by-norm’).
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Doe v. Nestle litigation – brought by former child slaves forced to harvest cocoa
in Côte d’Ivoire – involved allegations that defendant corporations aided and
abetted child slavery by providing assistance to the Ivorian farmers. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prohibition against slavery was universal and could be asserted against the corporate defendants. The Ninth Circuit
had previously held in Sarei that the norms against genocide and against war
crimes were applicable to corporations.72 In Sarei, in fact, the Ninth Circuit
had held that a norm could form the basis for an ats claim even in the absence
of a decision from an international tribunal enforcing that norm against a corporation. Returning to the Doe v. Nestle litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that
‘corporate liability under an ats claim does not depend on the existence of
international precedent enforcing legal norms against corporations’.73 Of significance is that the Ninth Circuit in Doe buttressed its finding with reference
to Article 3(c) of the ictr Statute. The Ninth Circuit noted that, pursuant to
the ictr Statute, the condemnation of ‘persons responsible’ for enslavement
of civilian populations was ‘broadly phrased’, which it took as evidence that
‘the prohibition against slavery applied to state actors and non-state actors
alike, and there are no rules exempting acts of enslavement carried out on
behalf of a corporation’.74
Circuit Court splits persist on the question whether corporations can be
liable for ats violations. Corporate liability under the ats remains unresolved.
This dissensus perhaps reflects – and contributes to – the ongoing (and seemingly intractable) debates under international law regarding corporate responsibility generally.
4	
i ctr Citations within the Broader Corpus of International
Criminal Law Materials
The search of the us federal judgments database organises itself around a
search for ictr cases and materials. Twenty-four of the twenty-five cases in the
72

73

74

Sarei v. Rio Tinto, plc, 671 F.3d 736, 759–61 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013),
remanded to 722 F.3d 1109 (2013), see supra note 62 (finding no bar to genocide liability
under the ats for corporations).
Doe (2014), p. 1021 (noting also that ‘the absence of decisions finding corporations liable
does not imply that corporate liability is a legal impossibility under international law’ and
‘that the lack of decisions holding corporations liable could be explained by strategic
considerations’).
Ibid., p. 1022 (citing also to Article 5(c) of the icty Statute).
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2013 baseline sample that reference ictr cases and materials also reference
icty materials. The work product of other international courts and tribunals
also surfaces. To be clear, no independent search for icty, icc, or Nurembergera materials ever was undertaken. The search was only for ictr case-law and
materials. In order to obtain a probative picture of the volume of references to
other international institutions, searches with those institutions as the search
term would have to be undertaken. It may well be that the number of ats cases
that reference icty case-law and materials while making no reference to ictr
materials is significant. The fact, however, that so many other international
materials come up in a search for ats judgments that reference ictr materials
demonstrates the entangled nature of these citations. The results of the ictr
search, notwithstanding their modesty, portend fascinating vignettes of
authority, systematicity, legitimacy, and fragmentation within the work product of international criminal courts and tribunals.
The case-law and materials of the icty and ictr overall tend to be cited by
us judges in complementary, and often perfunctory, string fashion to support
the same substantive legal rule. This methodology suggests that us federal
courts view the ictr and icty outputs as confirmatory of each other or, perhaps, that they determine the existence of a substantive legal rule of customary international law to emerge when the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc
tribunals is aligned.75 Ordinally, the palpable practice is to more prominently
feature the icty’s work. In this regard, the ictr lurks somewhat in the
shadows, so to speak. It is the less visible of the two: it is routinely there – to be
sure – but in the distance.76
us federal courts also cite to the Rome Statute, to the scsl, and to the
‘Nuremberg’ proceedings (both the imt and the amt). On rare occasion, the
International Court of Justice also surfaces.77 Within the text of ats opinions,
the Nuremberg-era sources typically precede discussion of the materials from
the contemporary international tribunals. us courts thereby approach the
development of a customary norm somewhat longitudinally, with citation to
the ad hoc tribunals crystallising the current status of the norm. On the other
75

76
77

Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 278 n.14 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring) (relying on the Ntakirutimana case in support of his proposition that the
Appeals Chamber of the two ad hoc tribunals ‘has made clear that the same law relating
to modes of liability applies in both Tribunals’).
In the Doe (2014) decision, for example, the work of the ictr trailed that of the scsl in
terms of number of references, and well trailed that of the icty.
See e.g., Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp.2d 1057, 1068–69, 1083, 1126 (c.d. Cal 2010), rev’d in part
and vacated in part, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
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hand, at times a perceived lack of clarity or continuity in the international
jurisprudence militates in favour of us courts’ finding that the norm lacks the
requisite definiteness and universality. This occurred, for example, when one
court faced the question whether ‘moral support’ and ‘tacit encouragement
and approval’ could be included within the scope of aiding and abetting.78
The frequency of citation to the imt and the amt is noteworthy, in part
simply because international criminal law has evolved so much since their
operation 70 years ago. The imt and amt, nonetheless, greatly appeal to us
judges and carry considerable legitimacy.79 One may speculate why this is so:
certainly, the iconicity of Nuremberg within the American vision of international justice looms large. From an instrumental litigation strategy, in
any event, Nuremberg references fare as well as or better than citations to contemporary institutions. ats litigants would be well-advised to reference the
work product of the amt and imt in their pleadings. Interestingly, one of the
citations to the ictr Akayesu judgment in the ats case-law is offered in support of the proposition that, in 1950, the International Law Commission formulated ‘principles recognized in the [London] Charter … and in the judgment of
the Tribunal’, as a codification of certain legal principles applied by the

78

79

Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp.2d 1057, 1103, 1108 (c.d. Cal 2010), rev’d in part and vacated in part,
766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). On this point, the district court referenced a number of ictr
cases (noting that omissions or failures to act give rise to aiding and abetting liability
when there is a legal duty to act, hence, in contexts akin to command responsibility and
citing inter alia Kayishema (May 1999 Trial Chamber)). This California district court additionally cited the Kayishema judgment in support of the proposition that, within discussions of command responsibility, ‘authority’ requires a high degree of control, either de
jure or de facto, over the perpetrators, and noting that the defendant in Kayishema case
was a préfet (‘top regional executive’). Ibid., pp. 1105–06. The district court also referenced
Akayesu in this regard. Ibid., p. 1106 (taking note of the defendant’s role as a ‘bourgmestre –
i.e. town mayor with control over police’ and citing to Akayesu 1998 Trial Judgment).
Ultimately, the district court deployed these citations to limit the persuasive value of the
ictr’s approach to aiding and abetting liability only to specific facts and individual
defendants and, thereby, to restrict its value in the determination of the substantive content of customary international criminal law.
See e.g., Doe viii (2011), pp. 52–55; Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp.2d 1057, 1084–1085, 1088–1093
(c.d. Cal 2010), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014); Doe (2014),
p. 1020 (describing ‘decisions of the post-World War ii International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg’ as ‘widely recognized as a critical part of customary international law’);
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 293 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (urging the court to defer ‘to the reasoned judgment
rendered at Nuremberg’ and viewing the Ministries case as an important benchmark).
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Nuremberg tribunals.80 To be clear, the ad hoc tribunals themselves have consistently ruled that World War ii era jurisprudence is indicative of customary
international law.
us courts cite to the Rome Statute as well. They do so despite the obvious
reality that the United States is not a party thereto and, under President Bush,
had in fact renounced its signature on the treaty. References to the Rome
Statute are often made to consolidate, buttress, or support interpretations of
the laws of nations grounded in citations to the ad hoc tribunals and
Nuremberg-era institutions. References to the Rome Statute, however, also
arise in contexts of dissonance and fragmentation, typically with regard to the
requirements for aiding and abetting liability where the approach of the Rome
Statute may be contrasted to that attributed to the ictr and icty. Whereas the
Rome Statute’s approach is seen as propounding a specific intent requirement
for aiding and abetting, ictr and icty materials tend to be understood to support a knowledge requirement. So, for example, in Doe viii it was held that the
ad hoc tribunals ‘have declared the knowledge standard suffices under customary international law’.81 This means that the aider and abettor does not need to
share the mens rea of the perpetrator but, rather, must only have knowledge
that his or her actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the
crime. The actus reus will be practical assistance, moral support, or encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.
As an aside, the amt decision in The Ministries case82 has been quizzically
understood in ats litigation as evidencing both the purpose standard83 and
80
81

82
83

Doe viii (2011), pp. 30–31 (d.c. Cir. 2011) (citing Akayesu 1998 Trial Judgment, para. 526).
Ibid., p. 36; see also ibid., p. 34 n.19 (‘The knowledge standard appears to conform with the
standard for aiding and abetting liability in many other countries, including France,
Germany, England, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland’). Principally, the Doe viii court
relied on the work of the icty in this context, but cited to the Ntakirutimana Appeals
Judgment (2004) and the Musema Trial Judgment (2000) as well. Ibid., p. 34.
United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries case), 11–13 April 1949, Nuremberg Military
Tribunal.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe viii took issue with this
approach: ‘[F]ocusing only on The Ministries Case overlooks the fact that in numerous
decisions of the Nuremberg tribunals defendants were convicted as aiders and abettors
based on a mens rea of knowledge and not purpose’. Doe viii (2011), p. 38 (emphasising
that, in the Ministries case, the tribunal acquitted Karl Rasche, a banker who had approved
loans to corporations he knew engaged in slave labour, but who lacked the purpose to
commit the crime). The scsl in the Taylor Appeals Judgment interpreted Rasche’s acquittal as implicating the actus reus of the crime, not the mens rea. Rasche’s acquittal is somewhat of a historical anomaly; he was apparently the only amt defendant to be held to a
purpose standard. On the other hand, the nature of Rasche’s involvement in atrocity does
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the knowledge standard.84 The Zyklon B case and the Flick case have been
invoked for historical support to substantiate a knowledge standard.85
In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Presbyterian Church and
Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in Khulumani it was held that liability may
arise when a defendant provides practical assistance to the principal that has
a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime and does so purposefully
to facilitate the commission of that crime. In reaching this conclusion, Judge
Katzmann gestured towards the language of the Rome Statute and found it
weightier because, in his view, the Rome Statute constitutes an authoritative
expression of the legal views of a great number of states.86 He did note, to be
sure, that there was ‘some support’ for a ‘definition of aiding and abetting that
would lead to liability where an individual provides substantial assistance
“with the knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the
commission of the specific crime of the principal”’.87 Notwithstanding these
fissures, Judge Katzmann saw the purpose standard as ‘well-established’ and
‘core’.88
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe viii, on the other
hand, rejected the Rome Statute as a source of the mens rea standard for aiding
and abetting liability.89 It did so because, in its opinion, the Rome Statute is a
treaty and not customary international law. This Circuit Court of Appeals
added that, in its view, the Rome Statute and the practice of the icc was not
unequivocal on the centrality of purpose as a legal element. Interestingly, in
the Aziz case, the Fourth Circuit criticised the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals for its treatment of the Rome Statute. The Fourth Circuit

84

85
86

87
88
89

bear some parallels with those of other business actors sued under the ats in their personal capacity and, by analogy, with corporate legal persons as well.
Doe (2014), p. 1023 (citing the Ministries case in support of the proposition that ‘the defendant’s knowledge regarding the intended use of a loan was sufficient to satisfy the mens
rea requirement, but declining to find that the defendant satisfied the actus reus
requirement’).
Ibid.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 276 (2d Cir. 2007) (reporting that the
Rome Statute has been signed by 139 countries, including ‘most of the mature democracies of the world’).
Ibid., p. 278 (citing to an icty judgment).
Ibid., p. 276 n.12.
Doe viii (2011), p. 36 (‘[T]he Rome Statute was not meant to affect or amend existing customary international law’); Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 2015 wl 5042118, p. *3 (6 July 2015) (d.d.c.)
(‘The Court of Appeals has held that the Rome Statute is not a persuasive source as to the
content of customary international law’).

international criminal law review 16 (2016) 412-447

442

Drumbl

agreed that the Rome Statute was not customary international law, but rejected
the notion that its status as a treaty favours a preference for the approach of
the ad hoc tribunals to aiding and abetting liability. The Fourth Circuit held
that:
We have no quarrel with the view of the Doe viii majority that the Rome
Statute does not express a rule of customary international law. We simply
find the Rome Statute’s mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability, reached after prolonged negotiations among delegates from over 100
signatory nations, to be a more authoritative barometer of international
expression on the subject.90
In Aziz, the Fourth Circuit also found that the fact that the ‘Rome Statute is not
binding on the United States … does not lessen its import as an international
treaty and, thus, a primary source of the law of nations’.91 Cycling back to Judge
Katzmann’s concurrence in Khulumani, the Aziz opinion held that defendants
must be plausibly alleged to have the purpose of facilitating the violations.
Aziz involved plaintiffs of Kurdish descent who were harmed by Iraqi government chemical weapon attacks or were relatives of those killed in such attacks.
The defendant was a British company that sold a chemical which could be
used to make mustard gas to another company that was a shell corporation
facilitating acquisition of that chemical for the Iraqi company in violation of
us law. The claim was dismissed because intentional conduct was insufficiently pleaded: an outcome similar to that in Mastafa. In Aziz, the Fourth
Circuit considered the fragmentation among international criminal courts and
tribunals and sources on this point as an indication of the vacillating and indeterminate nature of customary international law (i.e. calling customary international law an ‘elusive system’ for which the ‘difficulties in appli[cation] … are
manifest’).92
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished the facts pleaded in
the Ivorian child slavery case (Doe v. Nestle) from those in Aziz even within the
legal context of a purpose standard. The Ninth Circuit was drawn to the
inference ‘that the defendants placed increased revenues before basic human
welfare, and intended to pursue all options available to reduce their cost
for purchasing cocoa [… noting that] the use of child slavery benefitted the

90
91
92

Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 400 n.12 (4th Cir. 2011).
Ibid., p. 400.
Ibid.
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defendants and furthered their operational goals …’.93 The Ninth Circuit also
noted the defendants’ alleged lobbying efforts to defeat federal legislation that
would have required chocolate importers and manufacturers to certify and
label their chocolate as ‘slave free’.94
Insofar as the substantive rule of international law determines the rule of
decision to be applied in ats litigation, as the icc remains and the ad hocs
(and now the Mechanism (mict)) wind down their work, it may be that the
purpose requirement prevails over time. Treaty law can inform customary
international law and can become compelling evidence thereof. On the other
hand, actual icc jurisprudence might incline away from the purpose requirement even if textually this language derives from the Rome Statute.95
5

Conclusion

This article opens two little windows. One window looks out to the relationship between penal law and tort law in redressing human rights abuses. The
view from this window, to be sure, is limited by the fact that the ats encases
what is fundamentally a penal violation and attaches tort responsibility thereto
rather than incarceration. It is for this reason, perhaps, that recourse to international criminal law materials remains largely uneventful in ats tort-based
litigation.
The second window, however, gives way to a much wider expanse. The landscape from this window is one of movement of international norms to the
national level in different but cognate legal regimes. This article thereby identifies a new usage – in the case of the ad hoc tribunals, moreover, an after-life – of
the work product of the international tribunals, to wit, international criminal
law straying in extracurricular fashion into the domain of national tort law and

93
94
95

Doe (2014), p. 1024.
Ibid., pp. 1017, 1025.
Rome Statute article 25(3)(c) provides that: ‘a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person … for
the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists
in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its
commission’. Rome Statute article 25(3)(d), which addresses crimes committed by a
group of persons acting with a ‘common purpose’, provides that anyone with ‘knowledge
of the intention of the group to commit the crime’ may be held criminally liable. This
standard appears to differ textually from the standard applicable to aiding and abetting in
article 25(3)(c).
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directly into the hands of national judges of general civil jurisdiction.96 us
courts, and thus us judges of general jurisdiction, engage, and remain engaged
with, nettlesome questions central to the practice of international criminal
law. They approach the subject matter creatively, and give life to international
authorities in unexpected ways unforeseen to international criminal lawyers.
What to make of this extracurricular movement? On the one hand, these
migrations facilitate wider awareness, recognition, and internalisation of
international criminal law. It is not assured, however, that the content of the
law thusly diffused is accurately appreciated by national judges, or is even
capable of predictable appreciation, thereby imperilling international law’s
general aspirations of doctrinal consistency, universalism, and legitimacy.
International jurisprudence – no different than any sources of law or precedent – may be misapplied, or wishfully applied, in national contexts.
International judgments involving the specifics of a conflict or of a state with
which national judges may have little familiarity may be particularly susceptible to error in terms of subsequent extracurricular application.
The turn by us judges to international materials in ats litigation represents
an example of what Anthea Roberts identifies as ‘comparative international
law’, that is, the reality that national courts are more than just international law
enforcers, but may also serve as international law creators, and that national
variations in the judicialised domestication of international law is a subject
worthy of study.97 International law as shaped and created by national courts,
which may lead to divergent results dependent on the court or jurisdiction in
question, is, according to Roberts, a reality that ought to be central to any discussion of international law’s sources. On this note, perhaps Lord Hoffman’s
admonition – discussed earlier in this paper – of national courts as international law creators is ill-placed. While the Lively court may be chastised for
creating a new rule of international law, it may simply be unwise to expect a
national court to exercise greater restraint in applying customary international
law than national constitutional or human rights law. Acting in such a deferential fashion might excessively prioritise the place of legislatures and executives
in the process of incorporating international law. Drawing from the work of
96

97

On the law and politics of cross-fertilisation, see Sergey Vasiliev, ‘International Criminal
Tribunals in the Shadow of Strasbourg and Politics of Cross-Fertilization’, 84(3) Nordic
Journal of International Law (2015) 371–403.
Anthea Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating
and Enforcing International Law’, 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2011)
57–92, p. 60. Comparative international law studies how actors in different national and
regional systems interpret, understand, and apply international law.
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Karen Knop, who posits national courts as translators of norms rather than
mere enforcers of norms, Roberts observes that ‘even if national courts attempt
to faithfully enforce international law, its domestication requires them to
simultaneously assert their own legal language’.98
As among courts of various states, then, questions arise as to ‘what extent
national courts engage in strategic interpretation’ of customary international
law, rather than interpretation ‘based on prevailing practice and opinio juris’.99
Within the courts of a specific state, divergent understandings among national
judges as to the substantive content of international law may reflect the most
prosaic insights of legal realism: that is, the availability of international law
may simply accord judges another tool or device to achieve what they already
wish to achieve within the often fraught indeterminacy and selectivity of judicial method, in particular, in common law jurisdictions.
The purposes of tort law may differ so significantly from those of criminal
law, either in general or specifically the case of massive human rights violations, that movement from one realm to the other should best be viewed cautiously. Extracurricular application could therefore be dissuaded. International
criminal tribunals, on this note, might ex ante preempt such movement by
declaring that their work product ought to have limited reach. Judges on international tribunals might thereby disclaim the possibility that their national
counterparts operating in courts of general jurisdiction pick up their work
product and apply it to private law disputes.
Care should be taken to differentiate legal migration from legal circulation.
Circulation connotes an iterative cycle of refreshment and depletion and
return; migration, the term I have deployed in this paper, may readily be taken
to mean a unidirectional move to take root elsewhere, but migration might
also imply a return of sorts, albeit not an iterative or routine one. In this latter
regard, then, it might be of interest to systematically examine whether ats
jurisprudence informs, or even arises, in the judgments of the international
criminal tribunals.
Manuel Ventura is one scholar who has considered this issue. He has not
done so systematically, to be clear, but his work on aiding and abetting liability
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provides some valuable insights. Ventura notes that defense teams at the icty
and scsl have relied on ats cases, notably Presbyterian Church, in arguing for
an enhanced purpose requirement for aiding and abetting liability. Ventura
laments, however, that when the scsl and icty judges came to visit, and then
revisit, the specific direction requirement they failed to appreciate the pertinent analyses of us courts.100 He suggests that the debate over the mens rea
requirements that plague ats litigation is a ‘mirror image’ to the debates over
the requirements of the actus reus in cases of remoteness of the accused; yet,
the international tribunals have failed to learn from the robust conversations
that have occurred within the ats context.101 Ventura acidly notes:
[D]espite the analysis of international law contained in Presbyterian
Church of Sudan, Doe viii, and Aziz, none of this case law was mentioned
at all [in] the Perišić Appeal Judgment (though given the quality of its
analysis, this may not be so shocking). The Taylor Appeal Judgment did
refer to Presbyterian Church of Sudan and Doe viii in its analysis, but the
former only made an appearance as a faint ‘contra’ footnote reference
while the latter was footnoted only to support the (uncontroversial) position that the 1998 Rome Statute did not purport to codify international
law. There was no substantive engagement or analysis of their respective
reasoning, despite the fact that Doe viii directly supported the scsl’s
final position on the mens rea (and actus reus). [T]he Šainović Appeal
Judgment should surely have noticed the split in us courts on the mens
rea and its relevance to specific direction, particularly the fact that Doe
viii actually supported their conclusions on the customary definition of
aiding and abetting. No exploration of this case law was ever attempted
ether by the icty or the scsl.102
Hence, while international norms may have extracurricular application in this
specific instance at the domestic civil level, debates within the domestic civil
level inspired by the international migration may simply stop there. A lack of
endogeneity arises. As Ventura aptly notes, while us courts ‘are cognisant of
the discussions and debates in icl’, even in extracurricular contexts, ‘international lawyers should also be similarly aware that there is more to icl than the
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four corners of The Hague’.103 Ventura’s admonition is pertinent. International
law happens in many places far removed from its venerated centres. A new
wave of scholarship is emerging which explores the diverse historical hinterland of international criminal law and hence epistemologically pluralises the
roots from which we as international lawyers imagine our own discipline to
grow.104 As a profession, we would do well to embrace the diverse and disconnected venues – and the clever yet on occasion clumsy ways – in which international law is manufactured, often by bricolage. Fetishising the reified, and
often languid, vortices of the high-profile international tribunals belies the
vivacity and eclecticism of the places that make, apply, and chide international
law.
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